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supervisory strength and weakness in partner countries. We believe that the methods and models used
here can help in this task.
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  Risk is the salt and sugar of finance. When stock markets are calm, investors reward 
banking organizations that manage to increase their size, complexity, leverage, or maturity 
mismatch. This is partly because safety nets subsidize aggressive risk taking in good times 
and the accounting frameworks used by banks and government officials do not make anyone 
directly accountable for reporting or controlling these subsidies until and unless markets sour. 
  In the wake of the most recent financial crisis, the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) is striving to identify and to eliminate inconsistencies and gaps in the EU’s 
regulatory framework (Lannoo, 2009). This paper shows that, in the years leading up to the 
crisis, differences across countries in rules and enforcement allowed cross-border mergers by 
EU banks to expand their access to safety-net subsidies. As long as the problem of 
establishing a fair and efficient system for fiscal burden sharing remains intractable 
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2006), financial stability requires that home and host authorities 
assess the safety-net consequences of cross-border mergers. We believe the methods and 
models deployed in this paper provide the ESCB with a good place to start. 
I.  The Need to Reassess the Benefits and Costs of Cross-Country Banking Mergers 
 
How, why, and for whom individual mergers and acquisitions generate net economic 
benefits becomes an increasingly important policy issue as industries globalize and 
consolidate. For nonfinancial firms, analysis focuses on two overlapping possibilities: 
postmerger improvements in efficiency (which benefit firms and customers alike) and 
increases in market power (which benefit firms at the expense of their less-footloose 
customers). 
  In the financial sector, the existence of safety-net subsidies introduces two further 
sources for concern: opportunity costs generated by individual-country policies of entry or 
exit resistance and the possibility that the merger or acquisition represents a form of 
regulatory arbitrage.  When policymakers resist the exit or foreign takeovers of inefficient   4
domestic institutions, they subsidize particular firms and increase their market power. 
Opportunities for regulatory arbitrage occur when, by changing the geographic footprint of 
their activities, financial institutions (and some of their counterparties) can shift poorly 
monitored risk exposures to taxpayers in one or another country on advantageous terms 
(Kane, 2000; Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez, 2008; Campa and Hernando, 2008). In the 
absence of explicit procedures for assessing and redressing supervisory failings across 
countries, such transactions threaten to increase the fragility of financial systems around the 
world. 
  Evidence regarding the ex ante efficiency, market, and regulatory effects of cross-
border banking combinations comes mainly from event studies. Researchers first use one or 
more forms of market-model regression to identify significant shifts in parametric measures 
of either value or risk-taking at partner banks during or after merger events. When significant 
parameter shifts are observed, the estimated shift is regressed on various characteristics of 
one or the other merger partner and on structural characteristics of the markets, economies, or 
regulatory systems within which these firms operate (Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders, 2002; 
Buch and DeLong, 2008). Perhaps because the second stage of such studies has limited 
power to reject the hypotheses of no effect, these papers conclude that regulatory arbitrage 
has posed little problem for EU authorities. Based on a sample of 214 transactions, the first 
paper determined that EU banks making cross-border acquisitions in the years 1985-1998 did 
not change their risk exposures “in any significant way.” Looking at data for 81 EU cross-
border mergers announced during the years 1998-2002, the second paper opines that the 
supervisory structures of parent countries influence an institution’s total risk, but do not 
“greatly influence the systematic risk [i.e., the market or beta risk] of the merged bank” and 
that banks from “countries with strong supervision” were not trying to escape regulatory   5
discipline in their home countries or to extract safety-net benefits by extending their 
operations into countries where supervision is weaker. 
  Although these results are comforting, they are not fully convincing. They leave open 
some critical loose ends. First, neither paper directly estimates or controls for differences in 
safety-net benefits across countries. Second, while both papers incorporate indirect measures 
based on differences across countries in the scope of regulatory and supervisory powers, the 
models used do not and cannot control for variation in enforcement. Enforcement varies with 
the intensity with which authorities monitor individual-bank risk exposures and with the 
manner in which exercise their supervisory authority when excessive leverage or other forms 
of inappropriate risk-taking is observed. Vallascas and Hagendorff (2009) show that bidder 
banks in Europe managed to increase their exposure to default risk. Third, the possibility that 
merger partners differ from other banks with respect to the second-stage regressors (i.e., the 
issue of sample-selection bias) is not explored. 
  To address these concerns, this paper examines whether and how EU banks that 
engage in cross-border mergers (CBM banks) differ from other EU banks with respect to the 
safety-net benefits they extract or how effectively risk-shifting controls restrain their 
incremental risk-taking. Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez (2008) synthetically estimate 
differences in safety-net benefits and in supervisory effectiveness for EU-15 countries 
excluding Greece. These estimates use Hovakimian and Kane’s (2000) adaptation of the two-
equation model of capital discipline and safety-net control devised by Duan, Moreau, and 
Sealey (1992). 
Applying an improved maximum-likelihood method of estimation (Duan 1994; Duan 
and Simonato, 2002) to the same model and the same 1993-2004 Bancscope dataset, this 
paper shows that -- both within and across countries -- significant differences exist in risk-
taking and access to safety-net subsidies between CBM and other commercial banks. The   6
new method yields smaller, but similar differences between banks that Carbo, Kane and 
Rodriguez (2008) designate as “country-champion banks” and other banks in the sample. In 
this paper, we label these champion banks as too difficult to fail and unwind (TDFU) on the 
grounds that they are large and complex enough to compete in international markets and 
politically and administratively difficult to force into receivership.
1  On average across 
countries, CBM and TDFU banks are more leveraged and extract larger safety-net subsidies 
than other EU banks. More importantly, after CBM institutions complete a cross-border 
merger, even though their accounts show less leverage, their incremental access to safety-net 
benefits increases substantially -- presumably because they can game cross-country 
differences in regulatory systems to mask off-balance-sheet activity or to increase portfolio 
risk.  Postmerger effects turn out to be greater at acquirers than at targets. These findings 
prove robust to introducing a companion Heckman equation to select CBM banks.  
The crucial policy implication of our study is that cross-border mergers and 
individual-country exit resistance contributed to the current global financial turmoil by 
undermining the effectiveness of capital requirements and other supervisory controls on risk-
shifting in EU countries.  EU taxpayers, consumers of financial services, and commercial and 
savings banks competing with CBM institutions must ultimately pay for the bill for this 
supervisory failure.  If the goal of policy is to reduce the risk of failure for financial 
institutios, then regulators need to develop procedures for screening the adverse 
consequences that mergers and acquisitions might impose on individual-country and partner 
safety nets.    
 




                                                 
1 These banks are listed in an appendix to Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez (2008). 
2  This section presents an abbreviated version of the explanation found in Carbo, Kane, and Rodriguez (2008).   7
Risk-shifting occurs when creditors or guarantors are exposed to loss without 
receiving adequate compensation. This section describes the model we use to estimate 
effective capital controls and risk-shifting benefits at individual banks. This model linearizes 
Merton’s model of deposit insurance (1977, 1978). Merton portrays safety-net access as an 
option that allows bank owners to put the bank to safety-net managers for the face value of 
the bank’s debt. However, we follow Ronn and Verma (1986) in scaling down the price at 
which examination lags and political pressures allow authorities to enforce their takeover 
rights. The variable IPP expresses the fair premium for safety-net support per Euro (or per 
pound) of debt as an increasing function of a bank’s asset risk (σv) and leverage.  Leverage is 
measured as the ratio of the face value of an institution’s debt (B) to the estimated market 
value of its assets (V). 
The contribution of Duan, Moreau, and Sealey (1992) is to recognize that market and 
regulatory disciplines prevents B/V from being chosen independently of σv. To control risk-
shifting, counterparties and regulators may be expected to require B/V to fall when and as σv 
increases. Conveniently treating σv as the model’s exogenous regressor leads to the following 
reduced-form equations for B/V and IPP: 
B/V = α0 + α1σv + ε1  ,     (1) 
IPP = β0 + β1σv + ε2  .     (2) 
Equation (1) expresses the idea that regulators and creditors constrain banks to a 
mutually acceptable set of perceived leverage and volatility pairs. If safety-net managers 
could observe σv and control B/V perfectly, they would set B/V so that IPP equaled the value 
of the sum of explicit and implicit premiums they could impose on the bank. The slope 






1 ≡   ,       ( 3 )    8
1 2 1 1 1 ) / (












 .    (4) 
By themselves, the positive partial derivatives that are shown in equation (4) tell us 
how much value bank stockholders could extract from the safety net if managers were free to 
make unconstrained adjustments in volatility and leverage, respectively. However, in 
practice, safety-net officials and important private counterparties insist on having at least 
some power to monitor and constrain bank risk taking. 
Given the external discipline a bank faces, the sign of β1 in equation (2) indicates 
whether, in a country’s particular contracting environment, increases in asset volatility can 
increase the value of the implicit and explicit access to government credit support that is 
imbedded in the bank’s stock price. To neutralize risk-shifting incentives at the margin, 
disciplinary penalties that induce a decline in B/V must be large enough to offset fully 
whatever increase in IPP would otherwise be generated by choosing a higher σv. Empirically, 
as long as the total derivative β1 is positive, risk-shifting incentives are not completely 
neutralized. 
Thus, for market and regulatory pressure to discipline and potentially to neutralize 
incremental risk-shifting incentives, two conditions must be met: 
Bank capital increases with volatility:    α1 < 0, 
Guarantee values do not rise with volatility:   β1 ≤ 0. 
  None of the three variables featured in our equations is directly observable. However, 
Marcus and Shaked (1984) show how to use option-based models of deposit insurance to 
track these variables synthetically. The first step in the Marcus-Shaked procedure is to obtain 
tracking values for V and σv by numerical methods. These values are then used to estimate 
IPP as the value of a put option on bank assets (the so-called “default put.” A key step is to 
use Îto’s lemma to transform σv into σE, the instantaneous standard deviation of equity 
returns.    9
 
III.  A Preliminary Look at the Focal Variables 
To identify cross-border merging banks, we use the Thompson One-Banker M&A 
database for the European Union.  This source permits us to identify target and acquirer 
banks.  We further require that the selected mergers be registered as completed deals in the 
European Central Bank registry of banks.  Balance-sheet and income statement data for the 
merging banks come from the Bankscope database. 
Table 1 compares mean values for B/V, IPP, and σv for other banks in a country with 
those for CBM banks. Because no Danish or Finnish bank engaged in a cross-border merger 
during 1993-2004, these countries join Greece in dropping out of our analysis. 
  Except for Spain and Germany, CBM banks extract from country EU safety nets 
higher mean benefits than other banks do. Leverage is higher for CBM banks in three-fourths 
of the cases, while increases and decreases in asset volatility divide almost equally. 
  Table 2 shows for all banks and for CBM banks separately that leverage, fair 
premiums, and asset volatility differ significantly between most country pairs. This supports 
the hypothesis that selectively extending a bank’s operations into another EU country creates 
an opportunity for lowering a firm’s overall regulatory burden. For example, a bank can book 
risk exposures on which a home country enforces a high effective capital requirement in 
subsidiaries located in countries that treat these particular exposures less onerously. 
  Tables 3 and 4 aggregate the data globally. Table 3 shows that the link between 
leverage ratios and risk-taking is on average more closely policed at TDFU and CBM banks 
than for other banks. Without such policing (i.e., if α1 were ≥ 0), equation (4) shows that the 
correlation between B/V and IPP could not be negative. Table 4 establishes that on average 
CBM banks achieve slightly and insignificantly higher leverage and safety-net benefits than 
TDFU banks do, while other banks trail significantly in both respects. It also shows that, after 
a cross-border merger, leverage and safety-net benefits increase substantially.   10
 
IV.  Evidence that Cross-Border Mergers Offer Partner Institutions Incremental 
Regulatory Relief and Safety-Net Benefits 
 
Our next array of tables explore a series of difference-on-difference regression 
equations in which errors are clustered at the individual-bank level.  The first column of 
Table 5 shows that across the 12 sample countries, accounting capital is subject to less and 
less discipline as asset size increases.  However, although the leverage decisions of CBM 
banks receive more discipline, the second column shows that this discipline is not strong 
enough to prevent them from extracting incremental safety-net benefits.  At the margin, CBM 
banks find ways to expand their portfolio risk that extract safety-net subsidies. 
Table 6 contrasts CBM banks’ pre-merger and post-merger experience, suppressing 
the size term.  It shows that, although accounting capital is policed roughly twice as closely 
after a cross-border merger, CBM banks’ incremental access to safety-net benefits doubles.  
Wald tests confirm that these differences are highly significant. 
Table 7 indicates that discipline and benefits accrue differently at target and acquiring 
banks.  Although acquiring banks (who presumably initiate cross-border deals) face 
significantly more capital discipline, they extract significantly more safety-net benefit at the 
margin than targets do. These findings strongly support the hypothesis that the pursuit of 
safety-net benefits helps to motivate cross-border merger activity. 
 
V.  Controlling for the Effects of Selection Bias 
 
A growing empirical literature seeks to predict individual firms’ propensity to engage 
in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in a time-series, cross-section framework.  
Among other things, this literature emphasizes the role of size and relative profit performance 
as motives for banks to combine.  This leads us to hypothesize that targets or acquirers might 
be especially large and, when a cross-border deal is initiated, might be seeking to counteract   11
regulatory efforts to reduce safety-net benefits.  In Table 8, the negative sign that ΔIPP 
receives in predicting year-by-year cross-border activity among CBM banks confirms the 
hypothesis that -- as the Regulatory Dialectic (Kane, 2000 and 2009) would predict -- 
declines in the size of incremental safety-net benefits tend to call forth a benefit-restoring 
response from CBM banks.  This suggests the usefulness of modeling a bank’s willingness to 
combine with a cross-border partner in any year in a two-equation framework.  We do this by 
introducing the Mills odds ratio from time-series or cross-section Heckman selection 
equations as a regressor in our baseline models.  This ratio lets separate from the influence of 
asset size and other potential M&A determinants the effects of a bank’s leverage and access 
to safety-net benefits on a bank’s decision to participate in a cross-border deal. 
Hernando, Nieto, and Wall (2008) survey the literature on bank takeovers. An 
overarching theme of this research is that acquisitions should transfer control of assets from 
poorly managed targets to better managed acquirers. We amend this sentiment to underscore 
the possibility that unexploited opportunities for improved management of safety-net benefits 
may be a key concern. Ahern and Weston (2007) stress that firms that engage in successful 
merger and acquisition (M&A) programs do so over many years as a way of confronting 
various challenges posed by their economic environments. Carletti, Hartmann, and Ongena 
(2007) stress that such challenges include differences in the transparency and effectiveness of 
prudential and competition controls on M&A activities. To account for environmental 
differences, the expanded versions of equations (1) and (2) reported in this section 
incorporate country fixed effects. 
Table 8 reports year-by-year and pooled equations for selecting CBM banks 
(acquirers and targets) from our full sample of EU-12 banks. The year-by-year decline in 
sample size reflects the rapid pace of consolidation in the EU-12 financial sector. The nine 
included regressors combine the values of IPP and B/V with seven other variables that have   12
proved significant in previous studies of bank takeovers in the EU. Measures of safety-net 
benefits, leverage, asset size, tangible capitalization, intangible capital, and nondeposit debt 
prove highly significant in most years. High values of IPP, size, nondeposit debt, and 
intangible assets consistently encourage CBM activity, while leverage and tangible capital 
restrain it. In contrast to studies that examine within-country mergers, measures of operating 
inefficiency, liquidity, and ownership concentration are never significant. 
Coefficients of the significant variables move over time, but they usually remain 
within two standard errors of the values obtained in the pooled run. Appealing to Occam’s 
Razor (i.e., invoking the econometric norm of parsimony), we use the pooled selection 
equation to investigate and correct for sample-selection bias that might have crept into 
simpler models of IPP and B/V. 
An approved way to account for the potential endogeneity of any classificatory 
variable is to adopt Heckman’s procedure (1976, 1978). This introduces into our previous 
models a variable Heckman calls “Lambda.” This variable is also known as Mill’s inverse 
odds ratio (“Mills ratio”). It measure the covariance between the error terms of the single-
equation regression for an endogenous variable with the residuals from the selection 
equation. In our tables, the coefficient assigned to the Mills ratio measures how “surprising” 
it is to learn that a particular bank is either engaging in a cross-border merger or (in Tables 11 
and 13) acquiring a bank in another country. 
In Table 9, Lambda proves significantly negative in both panels. This indicates that 
incremental leverage and safety-net benefits are algebraically larger, the less surprising it 
seems for a particular bank to be engaging in a cross-border M&A. Compared to the 
estimates shown in Table 5, other coefficients move up or down by only one or two points at 
the third decimal place.   13
Table 7 indicates that safety-net benefits increase significantly more at acquirers than 
at targets. Within the class of CBM banks, Table 10 reports year-by-year and pooled 
equations for selecting acquirers from targets. Sample sizes are small, but grow over time. 
Again, our findings contrast with the literature on strictly domestic M&As in that leverage, 
size, inefficiency, nondeposit debt, and ownership concentration are never significant. 
Instead, safety-net benefits, intangible capital, and liquidity prove to be positive predictors for 
being an acquirer. The magnitude and significance of IPP and liquidity become especially 
large from 2000 on. Other things equal, tangible capitalization exerts a hard-to-interpret 
negative influence on the acquisition decision. 
Table 11 expands on the experiment reported in Table 7. It introduces the Mills ratio 
that emerges from using the pooled equation in Table 10. While other coefficients are not 
much affected, the more likely (i.e., the less surprising) it is for a particular bank to be the 
acquirer, the less incremental capital discipline it faces and the more safety-net benefits it can 
extract. We interpret this to mean that investors and creditors recognize that EU banks with 
an established cross-border acquisition program are adept at creating value through 
regulatory arbitrage. 
Allowing for sample-selection bias, Tables 12 and 13 report the outcomes of two final 
regression experiments. Table 12 investigates whether and how risk-shifting behavior at 
CBM banks varies before and after a cross-border merger. The coefficient of the Mills ratio is 
always negative, but becomes much larger and more significant after the transaction than it 
was before. Unsurprising combinations attract less capital and supervisory discipline than 
surprising ones. Although, other things equal, postmerger discipline grows with the size of 
the resulting conglomerate, incremental benefits from expanding asset risk increase as well. 
Table 13 contrasts the behavior of leverage and safety-net benefits at acquirers and 
targets prior to the cross-border transaction using Heckman’s two-equation framework. Other   14
things equal, target-bank access to incremental safety-net benefits (i.e., the coefficient of ∆σv) 
is twice that of acquirers. Taken together with our other results, this suggests that CBM 
acquirers identify targets that possess unexploited opportunities for extracting safety-net 
benefits. 
 
VI.  Summary Implications 
This paper confirms two complementary and worrisome hypotheses about the 
purposes that led EU banks to undertake cross-border M&A activity during our 1993-2004 
sample period. Regression evidence suggests first that these banks were not responding to 
opportunities for increasing their operating efficiency, at least as measured conventionally by 
their expense ratios. Instead, statistical analysis indicates that these banks were responding 
principally to opportunities for shifting risk onto EU safety nets. What makes this form of 
arbitrage hard to supervise is that in the short run a merger’s safety-net benefits tend to 
generate stock-price increases consistent with an apparent strengthening of the combined 
enterprise. However, over time, policies that do not adequately monitor and discipline 
merger-created safety-net benefits end up subsidizing risk–taking and dangerously increasing 
the fragility of a country’s banking system by making it more vulnerable to disruptive 
movements in the prices of important bank assets. The existing framework for supervising 
cross-border M&A activity at EU banks failed to monitor and control the ways in which 
merger-related regulatory arbitrage shifted risk onto national safety nets. Not just in the EU 
but throughout our globalizing economy, efforts to re-work cross-country supervisory 
arrangements deserve great priority. Our methods and models generate a metric that 
authorities can use to determine the extent to which safety-net benefits attach to merger deals. 
 
   15
REFERENCES 
Ahearn, Kenneth, and J. Fred Weston (2007). “M&As: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly,” 
Journal of Applied Finance, 17(Spring/Summer), 1-20. 
 
Ahimud, Yakov, Gayle DeLong, and Anthony Saunders (2002). “The Effects of Cross-
Border Bank Mergers on Bank Risk and Value,” Journal of International Money and 
Finance, 21, 857-77. 
 
Buch, Claudia M., and Gayle DeLong (2008). “Do Weak Supervisory Systems Encourage 
Bank Risk-Taking?,” Journal of Financial Stability, 4 (April), 23-39. 
 
Campo, José M., and Ignacio Hernando (2008). “The Reaction of Industry Insiders to M&As 
in the European Financial Industry,” Journal of Financial Services Research, 33 
(April), 127-46. 
 
Carletti, Elena, Phillipp Hartmann, and Steven Ongena. (2007). “The Economic Impact of 
Merger Control: What Is Special About Banking?” Frankfurt: European Central Bank 
Working Paper No. 786. 
 
Carbo, Santiago, Edward Kane, and Francisco Rodriguez. (2008). “Evidence of Differences 
in the Effectiveness of Safety-Net Management in European Union Countries,” 
Journal of Financial Services Research, 34, 151-76. 
 
Duan, Jin-Chuan (1994). “Maximum Likelihood Estimation Using Price Data of the 
Derivative Contract,” Mathematical Finance, 4, 155-67. 
 
Duan, J-C, A. F. Moreau, and C. W. Sealey. (1992). “Fixed-Rate Deposit Insurance and Risk-
Shifting Behavior at Commercial Banks,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 16, 715-
42. 
 
Duan, Jin-Chuan, and Jean-Guy Simonato. (2002). “Maximum Likelihood Estimation of 
Deposit Insurance Value with Interest-Rate Risk,” Journal of Empirical Finance, 9, 
109-32. 
 
Goodhart, Charles, and Dirk Schoenmaker. (2006). “Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in 
Europe,” London: LSE Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series (March). 
 
Heckman, James. (1976). “The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, 
Sample Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Sample Estimator for Such 
Models,” Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, 5, 475-92. 
 
_________________, (1978). “Dummy Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation 
System,” Econometrica, 46, 931-59. 
 
Hernando, Ignacio, Maria J. Nieto, and Larry D. Wall. (2008). “Determinants of Domestic 
and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions in the European Union.” Milan: Bocconi 
University, Paolo Baffi Centre Research Paper Series No. 2008-33. 
   16
Hovakimian, Armen, and Edward J. Kane. (2000). “Effectiveness of Capital Regulation at 
U.S. Commercial Banks, 1985-1994,” Journal of Finance,55(March).451-469. 
 
Kane, Edward J.( 2000). “Incentives for Banking Megamergers: What Motives Might 
Regulators Infer from Event-Study Evidence?,” Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 32 (August), 671-705. 
 
______________ (2009). “Extracting Nontransparent Safety Net Subsidies by Strategically 
Expanding and Contracting a Financial Institution’s Accounting Balance Sheet,” 
Journal of Financial Services Research (forthcoming). 
 
Lannoo, Karel. (2009). “The Road Ahead After De Larosière,” Brussels: Center for 
Economic Policy Studies, Policy Brief No. 195 (August 7). 
 
Marcus, Alan, and Israel Shaked. (1984). “The Valuation of FDIC Deposit Insurance Using 
Option-Pricing Estimates,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 16, 446-460. 
 
Merton, Robert C. (1977). “An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance and 
Loan Guarantees,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 1, 3-11. 
 
__________________. (1978). “on the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There Are 
Surveillance Costs,” Journal of Business, 51, 439-52. 
 
Ronn, Ehud, and A.R. Verma. (1986). “Pricing Risk-Adjusted Deposit Insurance: An Option-
Based Model,” Journal of Finance, 41, 871-95.  
 
Vallascas, Francesco, and Jens Hagendorff, (2009). “The Impact of European Bank Mergers 




   17
 
TABLE 1 
MEAN LEVERAGE RATIOS (B/V), MEAN FAIR PREMIUM (IPP), AND 
VOLATILITY OF RETURN ON ASSETS (σV): ALL BANKS VS. CROSS-BORDER 
MERGING BANKS 
Value of fair premiums generated by the procedure of Ronn and Verma-RV (JF, 1986) and 






  All banks (excluding cross-border 
merging banks)  Cross-border merging banks 
Country  B/V (%)  IPP (%)  σV (%)  B/V (%)  IPP (%)  σV (%) 
  RV ML RV ML RV ML RV ML RV ML RV ML 
Austria  84.3  89.6 0.128 0.093 1.428 1.232  94.9  95.8 0.262 0.203 0.866 0.633 
Belgium  89.3  92.4 0.116 0.071 1.893 1.631  96.5  97.6 0.242 0.116 1.762 1.369 
Denmark  88.6  92.7 0.280 0.186 2.937 2.525  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Finland  90.3  94.2 0.192 0.164 2.329 2.003  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Luxembourg  90.8  92.1 0.124 0.096 1.328 1.012  94.4  96.3 0.151 0.115 2.903 2.296 
Netherlands  84.3  87.5 0.131 0.088 1.906 1.639  84.4  88.5 0.193 0.143 1.713 1.367 
Portugal  85.0  88.6 0.122 0.093 1.922 1.637  92.9  94.6 0.194 0.151 1.179 0.805 
Sweden  89.3  93.3 0.139 0.114 1.998 1.556  94.6  98.2 0.199 0.160 0.197 0.156 
Ireland  85.4  86.9 0.141 0.119 1.628 1.420  91.1  94.3 0.192 0.155 2.284 1.692 
United 
Kingdom 
83.3  85.0 0.274 0.185 3.193 2.512  80.7  82.8 0.318 0.263 4.930 2.930 
Spain  81.0  83.7 0.218 0.193 1.558 1.323  87.1  90.0 0.205 0.188 1.058 0.503 
France  85.2  88.8 0.192 0.151 1.539 1.291  84.7  86.7 0.250 0.203 1.282 0.626 
Italy  83.9  85.7 0.183 0.163 1.102 0.096  93.4  96.5 0.301 0.256 2.693 1.897 
Germany  85.6  88.8 0.153 0.122 1.819 1.623  91.5  93.4 0.106 0.085 1.055 0.602 
All estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level 
The differences between the RV and the ML estimated parameters where found to be statistically significant in all 
cases according to the mean-difference tests.   18
TABLE 2A. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN B/V ACROSS 
COUNTRIES: ALL BANKS 
The test is the p–value of a one–tailed t–test on equal means in both groups. Duan’s ML method applied to obtain B/V values. 
 
 
TABLE 2B. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN IPP ACROSS 
COUNTRIES: ALL BANKS 


















Austria (1)  - 
Belgium (2)  0.006 - 
Denmark (3)  0.204  0.004 - 
Finland (4)  0.007 0.530 0.004  - 
Luxembourg (5)  0.003 0.008 0.004 0.136  - 
Netherlands (6)  0.104  0.006  0.326  0.002 0.003  - 
Portugal (7)  0.051 0.025 0.182  0.005 0.006 0.102  - 
Sweden (8)  0.021 0.061 0.007 0.171  0.025 0.027 0.061 - 
Ireland (9)  0.116  0.003  0.385  0.006 0.001 0.317  0.115  0.006  - 
United Kingdom (10)  0.010 0.001 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.008 0.004 0.008 - 
Spain (11)  0.003 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.004  - 
France (12)  0.144  0.010  0.208  0.011 0.001 0.210  0.191  0.006  0.326  0.016 0.007  - 
Italy (13)  0.120  0.007  0.326  0.0100 0.004  0.268  0.201  0.004  0.416  0.018 0.004  0.325  - 















Austria (1)  - 
Belgium (2)  0.021 - 
Denmark (3)  0.001 0.006  - 
Finland (4)  0.006 0.008 0.004  - 
Luxembourg (5)  0.020 0.014 0.003 0.006  - 
Netherlands (6)  0.252 0.303 0.002 0.004 0.011  - 
Portugal (7)  0.263  0.325  0.001 0.006 0.021 0.451  - 
Sweden (8)  0.008 0.032 0.003 0.048  0.006 0.041 0.031  - 
Ireland (9)  0.273 0.311 0.004 0.008 0.019 0.402 0.401  0.025 - 
United Kingdom (10)  0.006 0.004 0.003 0.060 0.004 0.014 0.008 0.011 0.005  - 
Spain (11)  0.007 0.006 0.002 0.044 0.002 0.011 0.009 0.016 0.004 0.401  - 
France (12)  0.005 0.003 0.006 0.032 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.018 0.008 0.392 0.466  - 
Italy (13)  0.007 0.002 0.004 0.031 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.020 0.009 0.407 0.281 0.322  - 
Germany (14)  0.032  0.340  0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.110 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.008  -   19
TABLE 2C. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN σV ACROSS 
COUNTRIES: ALL BANKS 
he test is the p–value of a one–tailed t–test on equal means in both groups. Duan’s ML method applied to obtain B/V values. 
 
TABLE 2D. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN B/V ACROSS 
COUNTRIES AMONG CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS 

















Austria (1)  - 
Belgium (2)  0.020 - 
Denmark (3)  0.002 0.001  - 
Finland (4)  0.003 0.008 0.008  - 
Luxembourg (5)  0.021 0.009 0.001 0.003  - 
Netherlands (6)  0.018  0.363  0.004 0.005 0.018  - 
Portugal (7)  0.020  0.270  0.003 0.005 0.025 0.101  - 
Sweden (8)  0.016  0.233  0.004 0.003 0.029 0.082  0.335 - 
Ireland (9)  0.012  0.311  0.005 0.004 0.015 0.290 0.205 0.107  - 
United Kingdom (10)  0.001 0.003 0.019 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006  - 
Spain (11)  0.121  0.011 0.002 0.002 0.027  0.028 0.016 0.007 0.004 0.003  - 
France (12)  0.182  0.015 0.003 0.004 0.033 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.012 0.004 0.396  - 
Italy (13)  0.063  0.005 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.185 0.104  - 















Austria (1)  - 
Belgium (2)  0.030 - 
Denmark (3)  - -  - 
Finland (4)  - -  -  - 
Luxembourg (5)  0.193  0.040 -  -  - 
Netherlands (6)  0.004 0.002  -  -  0.002  - 
Portugal (7)  0.028 0.016  -  -  0.035 0.005  - 
Sweden (8)  0.304  0.044  -  -  0.020 0.004 0.040  - 
Ireland (9)  0.010 0.008  -  -  0.452  0.012  0.106  0.030 - 
United Kingdom (10)  0.002 0.001  -  -  0.026 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.004  - 
Spain (11)  0.004 0.004  -  -  0.002 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.004  - 
France (12)  0.004 0.005  -  -  0.004 0.262  0.006 0.004 0.005 0.018 0.018  - 
Italy (13)  0.088  0.028 -  - 0.003  0.004  0.172 0.090 0.019 0.002 0.006 0.007  - 
Germany (14)  0.014 0.011  -  -  0.005 0.012 0.072  0.033  0.326  0.005 0.012 0.005 0.023  -   20
TABLE 2E. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN IPP ACROSS 
COUNTRIES AMONG CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS 





TABLE 2F. MEAN-DIFFERENCE TESTS: DIFFERENCES IN σV ACROSS 
COUNTRIES AMONG CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS 
















Austria (1)  - 
Belgium (2)  0.014 - 
Denmark (3)  - -  - 
Finland (4)  - -  -  - 
Luxembourg (5)  0.005 0.006  -  -  - 
Netherlands (6)  0.008  0.007 -  - 0.008  - 
Portugal (7)  0.007  0.010 -  - 0.010  0.301  - 
Sweden (8)  0.012  0.011 -  - 0.008  0.319 0.305  - 
Ireland (9)  0.008  0.010 -  - 0.011  0.326 0.363 0.303  - 
United Kingdom (10)  0.010  0.011 -  - 0.003  0.431  0.008 0.006 0.006  - 
Spain (11)  0.018  0.018 -  - 0.006  0.003  0.119 0.340 0.351 0.003 - 
France (12)  0.060 0.052  - -  0.003  0.287  0.014 0.014 0.015 0.011 0.016  - 
Italy (13)  0.012 0.013  -  -  0.005 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.251  0.010 0.015  - 















Austria (1)  - 
Belgium (2)  0.004 - 
Denmark (3)  - -  - 
Finland (4)  - -  -  - 
Luxembourg (5)  0.002 0.003  -  -  - 
Netherlands (6)  0.001  0.312  - -  0.005 - 
Portugal (7)  0.009  0.006 -  - 0.004  0.013  - 
Sweden (8)  0.005 0.002  -  -  0.003 0.004 0.008  - 
Ireland (9)  0.005 0.008  -  -  0.001 0.015 0.006 0.001  - 
United Kingdom (10)  0.001 0.001  -  -  0.010 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.005  - 
Spain (11)  0.032  0.005 -  - 0.007  0.013  0.087  0.003 0.007 0.001  - 
France (12)  0.009  0.010 -  - 0.005  0.019  0.071  0.004 0.008 0.004 0.040  - 
Italy (13)  0.005 0.006  -  -  0.020 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.020 0.002 0.007 0.008  - 
Germany (14)  0.055  0.008  -  -  0.005 0.013 0.103 0.005 0.013 0.001 0.593  0.031 0.006  -   21
 
TABLE 3. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN B/V AND IPP ACROSS COUNTRIES FOR 


























 RV  ML 
TDFU BANKS  -0.629  -0.723 
CROSS-BORDER 
MERGING BANKS  -0.721 -0.805 
OTHER BANKS 
(excluding TDFU and 
cross-border merging 
banks) 
-0.302 -0.439   22
 
TABLE 4 
MEAN LEVERAGE RATIOS (B/V), MEAN FAIR PREMIUM (IPP), AND 
VOLATILITY OF RETURN ON ASSETS (σV): ALL BANKS, TDFU BANKS AND 



























Country  B/V (%)  IPP (%)  σV (%) 





83.3 85.5  0.150  0.129  1.963  1.626 




90.1 93.1  0.226  0.196  1.662  1.410 
Pre-merger  88.1 91.9  0.194  0.162  1.433  1.205 
Post-merger  92.0 95.5  0.238  0.201  1.878  1.583 
Mean difference 
tests: OTHER 
BANKS vs.  TDFU 
BANKS 






0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001  0.002 0.001 
Mean difference 
tests:  TDFU BANKS 
vs. CROSS-BORDER 
MERGING BANKS 
0.192 0.228 0.217 0.233  0.226 0.263 
All estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level 
The test statistics report the p–value of a one–tailed t–test of the hypothesis that the means 
are equal for the indicated groups. 
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TABLE 5 
SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY-NET 
CONTROL IN THE EU-12 INCLUDING ASSET SIZE AS A REGRESSOR 
Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in 
its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face 
value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and 
third columns report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. 
The errors are clustered at the firm level 
 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 
  RV ML  RV  ML 


























Observations  13104 13104  13104  13104 
R
2  0.498 0.565  0.621  0.690 
        
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 6 
PRE- AND POST-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING BEHAVIOUR AT CROSS-BORDER 
MERGING BANKS  
Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in 
its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face 
value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The first entries 




   Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 
  RV ML  RV  ML 








Observations  292 292  292  292 
R
2  0.752 0.789  0.841  0.886 
Post-Merger 
   Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 








Observations  155 155  155  155 
R
2  0.614 0.757  0.740  0.744 
  
TEST OF THE 
DIFFERENCES IN
 
ΔσV BETWEEN PRE 
AND POST-MERGER 
PERIODS (p-value) 
0.004 0.002  0.003  0.003 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
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TABLE 7 
PRE-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING AT CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS: 
ACQUIRING VS. ACQUIRED BANKS  
Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in 
its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  B is the face 
value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and 
third columns report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. 
Errors are clustered at the firm level 
 
 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 
  RV ML  RV  ML 


























Observations  13104 13104  13104  13104 
R
2  0.584 0.696  0.695  0.702 
       
* Statistically significant at 5% level 




 TABLE 8 
SELECTION EQUATION FOR CBM BANKS: FIXED-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR EACH SAMPLE YEAR AND 1993-2004 EXPLAINING THE 
CBM-BANK DUMMY (1=CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANK; 0=NON-MERGING BANK) AS A FUNCTION OF SELECTED BANK CHARACTERISTICS. 






  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  1993-2004 




















































































































































































































































Observations  1325 1296 1215 1137 1103  1064  1032 1008  998  992  971  963  13104 



















* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level TABLE 9 
PRE- AND POST-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING AT CROSS-BORDER 
MERGING BANKS  
Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and 
changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  
B is the face value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank 
assets. The second and third columns report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. 
σV , IPP and B/V correspond to Duan’s ML estimations 




  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 


















Observations  13104 13104 
R
2  0.90 0.93 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 




























SELECTION EQUATION FOR ACQUIRING BANKS: FIXED-EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSIONS FOR EACH YEAR AND FOR 1993-2004 EXPLAINING 
THE ACQUIRING-BANKS DUMMY (1=ACQUIRING BANK; 0=TARGET BANK) AS A FUNCTION OF SELECTED BANK CHARACTERISTICS. 
σV , IPP and B/V correspond to Duan’s ML estimations 
 
 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004  1993-2004 




















































































































































































































































Observations  32 31 33 33 34  37  42 40 39 43 42  41  447 



















* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level  
 
TABLE 11 
DIFFERENCES IN PRE-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING AT ACQUIRING VS. 
ACQUIRED CBM BANKS  
Fixed-effects panel regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and 
changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV.  
B is the face value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank 
assets. The second and third columns report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. 
σV , IPP and B/V correspond to Duan’s ML estimations 





  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 


















Observations  13104 13104 
R
2  0.69 0.75 
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 12 
PRE- AND POST-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING AT CROSS-BORDER MERGING 
BANKS WITH HECKMAN’S CORRCTION FOR SELECTION BIAS  
Second-step panel regressions relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in its fair premium, ΔIPP, to the riskiness 
of its assets, ΔσV. and to the Lambda parameter (inverse Mills ratio estimated from the selection equation shown at the bottom of the 
table).  B is the face value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The second and third columns 
report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. σV , IPP and B/V correspond to Duan’s ML estimations  
Errors are clustered at the firm level 
 
Pre-Merger 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 












Observations  292 292 
R
2 0.98 0.97 
Post-Merger 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 












Observations  155 155 
R
2 0.89 0.86 
 
Selection equation: Probit estimations with fixed-effects relating a cross-border merging banks’ dummy (1=cross-border 
merging bank; 0=non-merging bank) to selected bank characteristics.
IPP  1.739** 
(4.64) 
B/V  -4.137** 
(-7.21) 
Bank size  0.105** 
(7.05) 
Bank inefficiency  0.018 
(0.93) 
Bank capitalization  -0.084** 
(-6.88) 
Bank liquidity  0.001 
(1.22) 
Intangible capital ratio  14.14** 
(5.21) 
Non-deposit debt ratio  1.68** 
(8.96) 
Ownership concentration  -0.196 
(-0.10) 
Observations  13104 
Log-likelihood -564.05 
Fraction of correct predictions 0.99
 
NOTE: Pre-merger banks are considered as a pro-forma combination of the values or partner merging banks in the pre-merger period. 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 










PRE-MERGER RISK-SHIFTING AT CROSS-BORDER MERGING BANKS WITH 
HECKMAN’S CORRECTION FOR SELECTION BIAS: ACQUIRING VS. TARGET 
BANKS  
Second-step panel data estimations relating changes in a bank’s leverage, (ΔB/V), and changes in its fair deposit insurance premium, 
ΔIPP, to the riskiness of its assets, ΔσV. and to the Lambda parameter (inverse Mills ratio estimated from the selection equation 
shown at the bottom of the table).  B is the face value of bank’s debt, including deposits. V is the market value of bank assets. The 
second and third columns report the value of α1 and β1, respectively. σV , IPP and B/V correspond to Duan’s ML estimations 
Errors are clustered at the firm level 
 
Acquiring bank 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 












Observations  282 282 
R
2  0.98 0.96 
Target bank 
  Δ(B/V)  ΔIPP 












Observations  165 165 
R
2  0.89 0.85 
 
Selection equation: Probit estimations with fixed-effects relating the acquiring vs. acquired banks dummy (1=acquiring 
bank; 0=target bank) to selected bank characteristics.
IPP  1.133** 
(4.61) 
B/V  1.015 
(0.84)
Bank size  -0.020 
(-0.42) 
Bank inefficiency  -0.096 
(-0.18) 
Bank capitalization  -0.199** 
(-8.02) 
Bank liquidity  0.011** 
(7.56) 
Intangible capital ratio  16.046* 
(2.31) 
Non-deposit debt ratio  -1.29 
(-1.71) 
Ownership concentration  -0.004 
(-0.02) 
Observations 447 
Log-likelihood  -190.10 
Fraction of correct predictions 0.69
 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 
** Statistically significant at 1% level   32
 
 
APPENDIX: VARIABLES DEFINITION 
-  IPP, “fair” insurance premium, defined as the per-period flow of safety-net benefits that 
bank stockholders enjoy. 
-  B/V, leverage, measured as the ratio of the book value (B) of deposits and other debt to 
the market value of a bank’s assets (V). 
-  σV:, volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the return on bank assets. 
-  B, total debt: computed as the difference between the book values of total assets and 
common equity.  
-  E, the market value of a bank’s equity: computed as the end-of-period stock-market 
capitalization.  
-  σE, standard deviation of the return on equity: computed as the standard deviation of 
deleveraged quarterly holding-period returns on stock. 
-  δ, fraction of bank assets distributed yearly as dividends to stockholders.  
-  Bank size, defined as the logarithm of bank total assets. 
-  Bank inefficiency, measured as the ratio “operating costs/net income”. 
-  Bank capitalization, measured as the ratio “capital/total assets”. 
-  Bank liquidity, measured as the ratio “liquid assets/deposits & short-term funding”. 
-  Intangible capital ratio: net intangible assets/total assets.  
-  Non-deposit debt ratio: non-deposit debt/total debt.  
-  Ownership concentration: percentage of the bank value of total shares which belong to 
companies or shareholders that own a portion of voting shares higher than 20%. 
 
These variables are taken directly from the Bankscope database, provided by Bureau Van Dijk. 
 